Tag Archives: Don Drummond

Not Quite the USA, But Canada’s Fiscal Challenges Can’t Be Ignored

Without a change in course, slow growth and rising spending will leave Canadians with stagnant living standards while shifting more of today’s burden onto younger and future generations, according to a new C.D. Howe Institute Verbatim.

In “The Endgame: Time to Act on Canada’s Economic and Fiscal Challenges,” author Don Drummond warns that Canada’s weak productivity and income underperformance, overreliance on US markets, and overall domestic vulnerabilities are not being taken seriously enough. He recommends a comprehensive economic plan to re-establish fiscal stability and help create a stronger, more resilient and diverse economy.

“With weak productivity growth, an ageing population and lower immigration, Canada’s economy could grow by just 0.5 percent this year and next,” says Drummond, Fellow-in-Residence at the C.D. Howe Institute. “That means rising deficits and debt, leaving governments with less fiscal room to respond to future challenges and improve living standards.”

The report states that Canada should expect continued tensions with the United States, making it more important to address its longstanding economic and fiscal weaknesses. Canada ranked last in the G7 for growth in gross national income per person over the decade to 2023 and has experienced persistently weak productivity growth. Combined with reduced access to US markets, these challenges make it harder for Canadian firms to compete and scale internationally. Drummond finds that these pressures will be harder to address as Canada’s population ages and the economy struggles to adapt to the costs of climate change.

His recommendations include eliminating internal trade barriers and streamlining regulatory processes, while reshaping taxes and spending to reduce deficits and support growth. This could include shifting some of the tax burden from corporate and personal income toward consumption, lowering marginal tax rates, and reviewing government spending to ensure better value for money. He also calls for maintaining environmental objectives and allowing post-secondary institutions greater flexibility on tuition. As frictions with the US persist and Canada’s federal deficits climb, Drummond calls for governments to act quickly but also asks that Canadians recognize that meaningful improvements will take time.

“While many cite Canada’s lower net debt-to-GDP ratio than other G7 countries, being the least indebted country in a heavily indebted group is not a fiscal strategy. The endgame should be a stronger, more resilient, and diverse economy with stable finances,” concludes Drummond. “Now’s the time to act.”

Introduction

A year ago, I spoke to the incoming 2025/26 Master of Public Administration (MPA) class about the economic and fiscal challenges facing Canada and the need for bold action (Drummond 2025). Conditions have not improved. You may think the latest trade friction with the United States suggests they have worsened, but a deterioration in the relationship was highly predictable, and tensions should be expected to continue. While some positive action has been taken, Canada is still not taking the challenges seriously enough. The bold action called for can be postponed no longer.

The Economic and Fiscal Challenges

Over the decade to 2023, gross national income per person grew a meagre 0.5 percent annually in Canada, ranking last in the G7 and 32nd out of 35 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (Drummond, Laurin and Robson 2026). This weak income growth reflects longstanding productivity underperformance relative to both Canada’s own history and other countries.

Canadian economic outcomes fall well short of US standards, and gaps are widening. Some take comfort in the argument that higher US averages are heavily influenced by the disproportionate number of extremely wealthy Americans. Yet the shortfall in Canadian inflation-adjusted median employment income was already substantial at CA$6,126 in 2010 and widened to $8,663 by 2024. From 1999 to 2025, Canadian productivity increased 26.7 percent, while US productivity rose 67.9 percent (Munro, Fuss and Emes 2026).

A severe blow to Canada’s most important trading relationship piles on top of the productivity challenge. The two interact in pernicious ways. Weak productivity makes it difficult to trade with other nations. Losing relatively free access to the US market makes it difficult for Canadian firms to build the scale needed to improve productivity.

Population ageing and climate change make the productivity and trade challenges even more difficult to address. An ageing population reduces the workforce and draws resources into healthcare and pensions. Climate change is exacting billions of dollars a year through infrastructure repairs, health costs, and rising insurance premiums resulting from flooding, wildfires, and extreme weather. The Canadian Climate Institute estimates that climate change will reduce Canada’s long-term annual economic growth rate by almost half, compounding into losses of hundreds of billions of dollars or more by the end of the century (Drummond, Philips and Harland 2026).

Canada’s fiscal situation acts as a drag on growth and limits our ability to address these challenges. The federal government alone projects deficits exceeding $50 billion a year as far as the eye can see, a net debt-to-GDP ratio staying above 40 percent, and tax and spending parameters that dull incentives to grow. And such dire outcomes do not fully reflect the commitment to massively increase defence spending. At least Canada’s fiscal situation and prospects are not as dire as those of the United States and many other countries.

Re-establishing fiscal stability is especially important now to mitigate the contagion from rising global bond yields, driven in good part by growing public debt burdens and a surge in long-term financing needs for artificial intelligence (AI). Canadian bond yields are creeping up but remain about 1 percentage point below US rates. That borrowing advantage is not guaranteed.

Inaction on stabilizing public finances is often justified by the Canadian federal government’s lower debt burden compared to other major countries and our own history. But the Canadian debt advantage is much less pronounced when considering all levels of government and using gross debt – which removes the current surpluses from the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans, which are not available to fund public services other than pensions. The current federal net debt burden of just over 40 percent of GDP, with about 13 cents of every revenue dollar going to debt charges, compares favourably with the 66.6 percent net debt-to-GDP ratio of 1995/96, when debt charges absorbed 35.2 cents of every revenue dollar. But it makes no sense to risk following the path of more indebted countries, which face even higher bond yields, or to repeat the worst of our own fiscal history, when Canada struggled to find buyers for its debt.

The only good thing that came out of Canada’s dire fiscal situation in the mid-1990s was the acceptance of a crisis and the will to act boldly. Surely, we can have the foresight to act boldly now before again hitting a fiscal wall.

The Status Quo is Unpromising

Drummond and Mahboubi (2026) projected Canada’s future economic growth rate assuming productivity continues to grow at its meagre average rate since 2000. Applying this assumption to the demographics resulting from population ageing and the new, lower immigration targets, this “supply-side” perspective on growth yields just 0.5 percent real GDP growth this year and next, and an average of 1.4 percent from 2026 to 2060 if the downward trend in average hours worked is arrested, or 1.2 percent if it is not.

The federal deficit would rise from the $50-billion-plus annual range projected in the 2026 Spring Economic Update, and the debt burden would continue rising as a share of GDP.

The bottom line would be stagnant economic well-being for individuals and a massive transfer of burdens to younger and future generations.

The Challenges Are Not Being Taken Seriously Enough

Undoubtedly, part of the reason bolder action has not been forthcoming is that many economists, especially forecasters, have put a rather rosy spin on prospects. Typical forecast assumptions include no further increase in the average tariff rate on Canadian exports and diminishing trade uncertainty. In other words, they attach no credibility to the rhetoric of President Donald Trump or the many trade agreements the US has been signing around the world that feature significant base levels of tariffs, with higher rates and quotas on selected products. We continue to see such a spin, with many rushing to predict that the latest round of US tariffs against Canada will only reduce real GDP by 0.4 or 0.5 percent, while assuring us that at least we still have the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA).

Such analyses of what is taking place at the margins miss the point that the fundamental premise of all free trade agreements struck with the United States over the past few decades – that companies, whether Canadian or foreign, can freely access the US market from a base in Canada – has been broken. It will take a long time, if ever, to restore confidence in that premise. We must ask: if companies were not investing much when they thought they had access to the US market, why would they when such access is threatened?

It is difficult to comprehend the steadfast assurance that average tariff rates will not rise or CUSMA protections will remain. The US has rejected automatic renewal of CUSMA, is breaking its commitments daily, and has made it clear that it expects to extract a fee from all those American firms that buy from outside the United States. The sort of fee it appears to have in mind, and has been extracting from other countries, can make it unprofitable for Canadian exporters and US importers to do business.

Output per hour worked – productivity – has averaged 0.8 percent growth since 2000 and only 0.5 percent over the past four years. Yet most forecasters assume much stronger rates going forward. The Bank of Canada, for example, assumes 1.4 percent average annual growth in productivity through 2028, a pace not seen in decades. It adds 0.2 percentage points per year for the growing application of AI and assumes employers will squeeze more output per worker from the dwindling labour force. These are unproven assumptions and still do not fully explain the optimism. Such forecasts feature much stronger growth than the “supply-side” projections of Drummond and Mahboubi (2026). The latter are not a forecast per se. Productivity could grow more strongly. Demand growth could outstrip supply. But outcomes could just as easily be even weaker. Given global uncertainty and trade tensions with the United States, it would be wise to take such downside risks more seriously.

The Bank of Canada should be given credit for at least thinking about the macroeconomic implications of AI applications. But much more work needs to be done on these issues. And in the meantime, some healthy scepticism about AI’s potential benefits for productivity is in order. First, there have been many technological breakthroughs during the period of Canada’s declining productivity growth. Second, work by the Future Skills Centre (2024) found that while firms applying AI have higher productivity than those that do not, AI itself did not raise productivity.

If the challenges were being taken seriously enough, the federal government would not have abandoned its promise from five years ago to establish an independent commission on productivity. It also would have followed through on its election promise to establish a group to examine corporate taxation. Clearly, the government understands the problems but has decided not to call upon expert advice or encourage national discussion at this time.

If the challenges were taken more seriously, we would not see federal and provincial politicians uniting in the quest for international free trade while maintaining internal trade barriers. The International Monetary Fund has said these barriers are equivalent to a 9 percent external tariff on all Canadian goods and services, and that removing them could raise real GDP by 7 percent in the long run (Diez and Yang 2026). Some barriers have been reduced since the IMF made these estimates, but they remain substantial.

If the challenges were taken seriously, we would see a concerted national – federal, provincial, territorial, and municipal – effort to streamline regulatory processes. Federal approval alone of projects can easily take more than five years. Add often separate and sequential approval processes at the provincial, territorial, municipal, and Indigenous levels, and the projects being bandied around amid renewed interest in infrastructure may not even start for a long time.

Canada’s potential advantage in critical minerals is being cited often of late. But development, if it proves to be economically beneficial, could take decades. The federal government is taking action, including setting up a Major Projects Office and enacting the Building Canada Act. It has been noted, however, that the underlying obstacles – “political decision-making over individual projects and open-ended criteria that require regulators to consider broad public policy objectives” remain largely unaffected (Vegh and Koplovich 2026).

If the challenges were taken seriously enough, we would have a comprehensive federal economic plan that realistically lays out the challenges, presents options for national consultation, and sets out a plan for bold action. Instead, we get speeches, webinars, and budget documents that cover the territory only partially and reach relatively few Canadians. The prime minister has said Canadians will be required to make sacrifices. But time after time, the government softens those sacrifices by borrowing more money: to increase the Old Age Security payments for those 75 and over, a cohort with one of the lowest poverty rates; to rename the GST low-income credit the Canada Groceries and Essentials Benefit (CGEB) and increase it; to offer more incentives to first-time home buyers and purchasers of new homes; to suspend the federal gasoline excise tax for six months – and then extend the suspension as gasoline prices failed to decline; and to put still more money into subsidies for childcare.

In all these cases, the federal government addresses affordability issues by borrowing more. That simply transfers the burden forward. Where there is a demand-supply balance, demand is stoked further with much less effort applied to supply enhancement. Affordability challenges would be better met by greater efforts to raise Canadian productivity and incomes. Some of the government’s actions, such as more infrastructure spending, will certainly help productivity, but a cohesive plan is not being applied across all spending.

If the challenges were taken seriously enough, we would not see the federal government take the more than $5 billion fiscal windfall from higher oil prices and spend every cent of it in the 2025 budget, mostly to bolster consumption. We would not have seen an 80 percent increase in government operating costs over 10 years, with a 90,000 expansion in the number of federal civil servants – a one-third increase – together with a doubling of contracting costs. Average compensation for full-time equivalent bureaucrats also reached $143,271 (Terrazzano 2026). That is far higher than what is made by the majority of Canadians funding such pay through their taxes. Despite this growth, services do not appear to have improved. The government has cited new programs such as pharmacare and the Canadian Dental Plan, but much of the administrative burden is carried by the provinces and the private sector. Efforts to cut federal spending have been half-hearted, often going little beyond incentivizing civil servants to leave. Even after these so-called cuts, the ratio of program spending to GDP, is projected to reach its highest level since 1994/95 by 2030, outside of the pandemic years.

What Would a Strategy Look Like?

The starting point for a more serious course of action would be to put a comprehensive economic plan to Canadians, realistically depicting the challenges and options for action. If Canadians understand the gravity of the situation, they will give political licence to act, as they did with the initial Free Trade Agreement and the assault on the deficit in 1995.

Governments and private sector agents would cut the wishful thinking from their projections and depict the probable problems under the status quo.

Governments at all levels and in all jurisdictions would unite to finally end internal trade barriers. They would work together to streamline regulatory processes without compromising environmental standards or Indigenous rights. And they would do it soon and quickly.

Governments would radically alter the fiscal landscape with lower deficits and debt burdens and taxation and spending parameters targeted at promoting growth. The focus would be on much lower spending. Restoring the ratio of program spending to GDP that prevailed from 2003/04 to 2019/20 would reduce spending by $66 billion by 2030 and, on its own, bring the budget back close to balance.

The federal government would proceed with the promised review of taxation. The recommendation would inevitably be to shift the composition of Canadian taxation away from the overuse of corporate and personal income taxes, which are the most damaging to economic growth, and toward consumption taxes. The government would cut corporate and personal income tax marginal rates (see Mintz, Laurin, and Dahir 2026). It would also end the steep marginal corporate income tax rate corporations face if they try to grow beyond the definition of a small business.

A federal government plan would feature a comprehensive review of spending with a value-for-money perspective. Programs that could not be reformed to deliver intended outcomes efficiently would be scrapped. The results of the review would be made public to Canadians. The resulting action would need to be sweeping, such as gradually raising the age of entitlement for Old Age Security (OAS) and lowering the income threshold at which OAS payments are clawed back. Programs like $10-a-day childcare would be reformed to recognize that a crisis of affordability has become a crisis of accessibility. Business subsidies should be cut back drastically, as many simply transfer income rather than address market failure. Only about 20 percent of subsidies boost real income (Lester 2026). Supply management in agriculture should be reformed, not to appease the United States, but to raise productivity and lower prices in Canada. Supply management need not be scrapped. The focus should be on greater flexibility in quotas and caps on subsidized prices.

A serious approach would also recommit to environmental objectives, including lower greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change. It is not fashionable of late to speak of environmental objectives, as many countries emphasize economic growth. But the future of the planet and its people depends upon reducing emissions. And this need not come at the expense of economic growth. Putting more emphasis on clean growth would be a start. The focus lately seems to be all on the development of fossil fuels and getting them to markets. But the combined global market value of clean energy technologies has grown about 20 percent per year over the past decade. Ironically, two of the world’s largest emitters lead in several dimensions of clean growth. China tops the world in clean energy infrastructure, and the United States invested over US$278 billion in clean energy and transportation in 2025 alone. Canada does not have to match their scale to capture a portion of the prize; it just has to identify and focus on existing competitive advantages (Drummond, Philips and Harland 2026). We now have a National Electricity Strategy. But it does not have nearly the buzz of the attention being given to fossil fuel development.

Government plans would recognize that Canada’s post-secondary education system can be a bedrock for people’s prosperity and well-being gains. Ontario has finally lifted the freeze on tuition. But by 2025, the initial cut and subsequent freeze had brought real (after-inflation) tuition in Ontario 26.6 percent below the 2018 level. That loss in real value is locked in for the foreseeable future. The February 2026 Ontario announcement raises grants by about $1 billion per year, but by 2027/28, they will still be more than 10 percent below 2015/16 in real terms per eligible student (Drummond 2026).

Institutions should be allowed greater flexibility on tuition. The after-inflation value of Ontario and federal grants for research should be restored and be better aligned with the economic transformation the province and Canada must accomplish. Governments should provide incentives to commercialize university-based research. Universities should be allowed to enrol more foreign students with proper accountability and objectives in place. The recent increase in the income requirements for foreign students is a good first step to curtail abuse, which was never widespread in universities, and should be complemented by ending foreign students’ ability to work off campus.

The Endgame and How to Get There

Canada has allowed itself to become too dependent on the United States and has ignored our domestic vulnerabilities for far too long. We are now paying the price. But by addressing the challenges, we can get to an endgame of a new economic and fiscal model that has a stronger, more resilient, and diverse economy with stable finances. The goal should be nothing less than being better off than we have ever been.

What will it take to get to this endgame?

  • An honest recognition of the economic and fiscal challenges.
  • A comprehensive plan.
  • Transparency with Canadians about the problems and the plan, sparking national discussion, debate, and hopefully, consensus on action.
  • A willingness to act.
  • Speed in acting, but patience with the inevitable lags in realizing improvements.

Conclusion: Let’s Act Now

Actions such as those recommended above always meet resistance as too controversial to be supported by the Canadian public and, hence, politicians, or too difficult to pull off within our system of federalism. But that may only be true if Canadians are not fully apprised of the seriousness of Canada’s economic and fiscal challenges. With such unfiltered information and a plan to ensure Canada’s prosperity, Canadians would likely offer widespread support, as they have in response to previous national challenges.

We must get serious and act now.

Edited remarks delivered to the School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, on September 4, 2026. By Don Drummond

The author extends gratitude to Alexandre Laurin and Daniel Schwanen for valuable comments and suggestions. The author retains responsibility for any errors and the views expressed.

Don Drummond is a Fellow-in-Residence at the C.D. Howe Institute and a Stauffer-Dunning Fellow, School of Policy Studies, at Queen’s University.

References

Diez, Federico J., and Yuanchen Yang. 2026. “Canada Can Grow Faster by Unlocking Its Own Market.” International Monetary Fund. January 27. https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/01/27/cf-canada-can-grow-faster-by-unlocking-its-own-market.

Drummond, Don. 2025. “Shaken by Tariffs, Still Weak from Within: Canada Needs a New Economic and Fiscal Model.” Verbatim. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute. September 4. https://cdhowe.org/publication/shaken-by-tariffs-still-weak-from-within-canada-needs-a-new-economic-and-fiscal-model/.

_____________. 2026. “Ontario Stops Deepening its Universities’ Financial Pit.” Intelligence Memo. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute. March 6. https://cdhowe.org/publication/ontario-stops-deepening-its-universities-financial-pit/.

Drummond, Don, Alexandre Laurin, and William B.P. Robson. 2026. 2026 Shadow Budget. Commentary. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute. Forthcoming.

Drummond, Don, and Parisa Mahboubi. 2026. “Resetting Expectations: Canada’s Economy in a Lower-Immigration Era.” E-Brief 383. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute. May. https://cdhowe.org/publication/resetting-expectations-canadas-economy-in-a-lower-immigration-era/.

Drummond, Don, Peter Philips, and Kate Harland. 2026. “Canada Doesn’t Need to Abandon Climate Efforts in the Name of Growth or Unity.” The Hill Times. September 7.

Future Skills Centre. 2024. Waiting for Takeoff: The Short-Term Impact of AI Adoption on Firm Productivity. December.

Mintz, Jack, Alexandre Laurin, and Nicholas Dahir. 2026. “Big Bang” Tax Reform: Unleashing Growth in the Canadian Economy. Commentary 707. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute. https://cdhowe.org/publication/big-bang-tax-reform-unleashing-growth-in-the-canadian-economy/.

Munro, Grady, Jake Fuss, and Joel Emes. 2026. Squandering the Canadian Century Part 1: Comparing Economic Performance in Canada and the United States. Fraser Institute. September 1. https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/squandering-canadian-century-part-1-comparing-economic-performance-canada-and-united-states.

Terrazzano, Franco. 2026. “Cost of Federal Bureaucracy Up 80 Per Cent in 10 Years: PBO.” Canadian Taxpayers Federation. February 17.

Vegh, George, and Kate Koplovich. 2026. Clear the Way: Does the Building Canada Act Help Canada Build? Commentary 728. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute. September. https://cdhowe.org/publication/clear-the-way-does-the-building-canada-act-help-canada-build/.

Pas tout à fait les États-Unis, mais les défis budgétaires du Canada ne peuvent être ignorés

16 septembre 2026 – Sans changement de cap, la faible croissance et l’augmentation des dépenses entraîneront une stagnation du niveau de vie des Canadiens, tout en transférant la majeure partie de la dette actuelle aux jeunes générations et aux générations futures, selon un nouveau Verbatim de l’Institut C.D. Howe.

Dans « The Endgame: Time to Act on Canada’s Economic and Fiscal Challenges », l’auteur Don Drummond avertit que la faible productivité du Canada, la contre-performance de ses revenus, sa dépendance excessive à l’égard des marchés américains et ses vulnérabilités intérieures ne sont pas suffisamment prises au sérieux. Il recommande un plan économique qui vise à rétablir la stabilité budgétaire et à créer une économie plus forte, plus résiliente et plus diversifiée.


Lire communiqué de presse complet »

Immigration Policy Needs Fundamental Reform, Council Warns

September 2025 – Canada’s immigration policy continues to move in the wrong direction and requires a fundamental course correction, according to a new Communiqué from the C.D. Howe Institute’s Immigration Targets Council.

In “Immigration Policy Still in Need of a Course Correction,” the Council – composed of leading academics and policy experts – stresses that who is selected matters more than meeting numeric targets. They determined that immigration should be guided by human capital and long-term prosperity, not short-term labour market fixes or non-economic objectives. Notably, members also emphasized the importance of transparent, predictable policy that ensures economic immigrants have strong skills, earnings potential, and integration prospects.

Second Meeting of the C.D. Howe Institute Immigration Targets Council

The C.D. Howe Institute Immigration Targets Council held its second meeting on August 26, 2025, bringing together leading academics and policy experts to provide recommendations on Canada’s immigration-level targets and system design.1

Members agreed that Canada’s immigration policy has moved in the wrong direction and needs a fundamental course correction. Members stressed that the labour market skills and earnings potential of immigrants – both temporary and permanent – matter more than meeting numeric targets. Immigration policy should raise average human capital, rather than focusing narrowly on filling short-term labour market gaps, which prevents wage increases and capital investment to enhance productivity, or meeting non-economic objectives such as increasing Francophone immigration outside Quebec. Policy should also be transparent, predictable, and oriented toward long-term prosperity, ensuring that economic immigrants have strong skills, earnings potential, and integration prospects.

Building on these principles, the Council recommended annual permanent resident admissions of 365,000 in 2026, 360,000 in 2027, and 350,000 in 2028, reflecting the Council’s median votes. For 2026, this recommendation is modestly below the government’s current target of 380,000. Some members favoured a gradual reduction over three years to return to historical norms, while others supported higher levels to ease transitions from the non-permanent resident (NPR) population.

The group also raised serious concerns about the rapid growth and complexity of the NPR (Non permanent residency) population, as well as persistent challenges in the asylum system.

Members emphasized the importance of clear guardrails for the NPR population, recommending that the government maintain a ceiling of 5 percent of Canada’s population for NPRs in 2026, with a review in early 2027. They noted that the optimal NPR share requires balancing inflows, outflows, and clear pathways for temporary residents employed in high-skill occupations to transition to permanent residency, using objective criteria such as earnings. Improving efficiency in the asylum system was viewed as critical to protect genuine claimants and reduce pressures on the broader immigration system, since many currently see asylum as a pathway to permanent residency.

The Council further agreed that immigration programs require substantial reforms.

Regarding temporary immigration, members expressed concern that the international student system has become a pathway for low-wage labour rather than a means of attracting top global talent. They recommended higher admission standards, stronger language and academic requirements, limits on off-campus work, and stronger federal oversight to ensure only high-quality institutions and programs are eligible. Similarly, the Temporary Foreign Worker Program should be scaled back and not be used as a substitute for raising wages or improving working conditions, since relying on temporary workers can reduce employers’ incentives to offer better pay or workplace standards. Reducing reliance on low-skilled temporary workers – except in sectors such as agriculture, where transitions take time – was viewed by the group as essential to encourage productivity growth and higher wages for Canadian workers.

For permanent immigration, members were critical of the proliferation of boutique pathways in the economic class, such as category-based selection – targeted draws from the Express Entry pool based on specific attributes like occupation or language – and provincial nominee programs that prioritize lower-skilled workers, which allow provinces and territories to nominate candidates to meet regional labour market needs. They highlighted the need to simplify and strengthen the selection mechanism and agreed that Canada should move toward a single, transparent system centred on Express Entry and the Comprehensive Ranking System (CRS), a points-based tool used to assess, score, and rank candidates in the pool. They supported a human-capital-based model for economic principal applicants, which evaluates individuals on their education, work experience, and language ability, with a revised CRS that places greater weight on predictors of long-term success. New criteria should include the field of study for all applicants and verified earnings in Canada for those with prior Canadian experience. All economic principal applicants, they stressed, should be required to meet the CRS threshold. Members also agreed that these reforms – across temporary and permanent immigration programs, together with improving the integrity of the asylum system – are essential to reducing the size of the non-permanent resident population.

In addition, members highlighted the importance of fast-track pathways and policies to attract top-tier global talent. They called for stronger federal–provincial coordination and targeted initiatives to recruit individuals with extraordinary achievements in fields with lasting impact, such as science, medicine, and artificial intelligence. For high-profile research leaders, this should include pathways that allow them to bring their teams. Attracting such talent, they noted, requires not only immigration pathways but also the infrastructure and support that world-class research demands.

In conclusion, the Council emphasized the urgent need to restore a principled and sustainable immigration policy. By focusing on raising human capital, maintaining guardrails on the non-permanent resident population, addressing weaknesses in the asylum system, and reforming the economic immigration system, Canada can ensure that immigration contributes to long-term prosperity and sustains public confidence.

Members of the C.D. Howe Institute Immigration Targets Council:

Members participate in their personal capacities, and the views collectively expressed do not represent those of any individual, institution, or client.

Convener:

• Parisa Mahboubi, C.D. Howe Institute

Members:

• Don Drummond, Queen’s University

• Pierre Fortin, Université du Québec à Montréal

• David Green, University of British Columbia

• Daniel Hiebert, University of British Columbia

• Michael Haan, Western University

• Jason Kenney, Bennett Jones LLP

• Mikal Skuterud, University of Waterloo

• Christopher Worswick, Carleton University

• Donald Wright, C.D. Howe Institute and Global Public Affairs

Third Swing At Canada Carbon Tax Analysis By PBO

Let’s Hope for Solid Hit from the PBO’s Third Swing at Carbon Tax Analysis

The “corrected” analysis by the Parliamentary Budget Office of the carbon tax and rebates is due soon. One hopes it will get more things right in this third crack at evaluating the government of Canada’s assurance that most Canadians will receive enough from the carbon tax rebates to cover their cost of paying the tax.

Reporting in 2022 and in an update last year, the PBO analysis confirmed the government assertion so long as induced economic effects from the carbon levy are not included. However, once the economic damage from the levy is included, the PBO concluded that the rebates fall short of keeping family budgets whole. 

The PBO’s conclusion was seized on by Conservative politicians and others to justify calls to revoke the carbon tax. Now, more knives have come out. The NDP says it would scrap the tax on households and put the burden on large emitters, but it does not yet explain how it would square that with the current big-emitter carbon tax. And BC, where carbon taxing began in Canada, has said it would drop the tax if Ottawa removed the legal requirement.

Much is at stake with this third PBO swing.

After the second report, the PBO admitted that its analysis had included, in addition to the carbon tax on households, the tax on large emitters as well. The economic impacts had been taken from work passed over to the PBO by Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC), which included the effects of the tax as applied to both industrial and household payers. The budget officer said the error was small and had little consequence for the analysis and promised a corrected version this fall. 

The Canadian Climate Institute estimates that 20-48 percent of the emissions reduction by 2030 will come from the levy on large emitters compared to 8-14 percent from households. Given the scale of the large emitters tax, it is likely that it has significant economic effects on any forecast. Fixing this should not, however, be the most consequential revision to its analysis. 

The PBO’s first two efforts had an analytical asymmetry. It measured the economic cost originating in the tax, exaggerated as it turned out, but did not attempt to capture the economic benefits (not to mention any health gains) from the effects of the household carbon levy in mitigating climate change. Put differently, their work was, in effect, based upon the faulty premise that climate change brings no economic damage. The massive and growing costs of cleaning up fire and flood damage and adapting to the many other consequences of global warming bear evidence of such costs. The PBO could and should do its own analysis of those climate change costs and, hence, the benefits of mitigation. Or it could more easily tap into the substantial body of available literature.

Lowering Canada’s Gross Domestic Product

In Damage Control, the Canadian Climate Institute estimated climate change would lower the Gross Domestic Product by $35 billion from what it would otherwise have been in 2030; the impact would rise to $80 to $103 billion by 2055. Through cutting emissions, the household carbon tax will reduce this cost. International literature is rich, and the PBO could review it for applicability to Canada. As but one example, Howard and Sterner’s (2017) meta-analysis on the impacts of climate change concluded most studies underestimated them. Their preferred estimate points to a GDP hit of between 7 and 8 percent of GDP if there are no catastrophic damages and 9 to 10 percent if there are. Conceptual thinking is also advancing. Consideration is being given to there being “tipping points” where a certain degree of climate change may have much more non-linear dramatic economic effects. Some, like Stern and Stigliz, even question the worth of comparing an economic outlook with mitigation action against a status quo baseline as the PBO has done. They argue that without mitigation, there may not be a sustainable economic outcome. 

Finally, those still inclined to think that a corrected Fall 2024 PBO report will provide ammunition to “axe the tax” need to ask themselves two questions.

First, is there value in the emissions reduction resulting from the household carbon tax? The Canadian Climate Institute concludes that the 8-14 percent contribution to emissions reduction by 2030 will grow in later years. Even with the tax and all the other policies announced to date, there is a 42-megatonne gap in Canada’s 2030 emissions reduction target. More than 200 Canadian economists signed an open letter asserting that “carbon pricing is the lowest cost approach because it gives each person and business the flexibility to choose the best way to reduce their carbon footprints. Other methods, such as direct regulations, tend to be more intrusive and inflexible, and cost more.” If not the household carbon tax, then what else?  

Let us hope the PBO’s third carbon tax report gives evidence to form a more balanced perspective. For The Silo, Don Drummond/C.D. Howe Institute.

Don Drummond is the Stauffer-Dunning Fellow in Global Public Policy and Adjunct Professor at the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University and a Fellow-In-Residence at the C.D. Howe Institute.