“According to a report from Bloomberg, recently released satellite images appear to show damage done to two Amazon data centers in Bahrain, which the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) previously claimed to have hit.” gizmodo.com
With satellite imagery now appearing to corroborate the recent strikes on Amazon’s Bahrain data centers, the question of how commercial data centers actually defend themselves has become live.
Amazon’s presence in Bahrain is registered under Amazon Data Services Bahrain S.P.C, located at Bahrain World Trade Center, Level 9, Building B0001, Isa Al-Kabeer Avenue (Road 365), Flat 938, Clock 316, Manama, Bahrain
Laurynas Šatas, CEO of Aktyvus Photonics, a defence technology company developing laser-based precision targeting systems for NATO tactical drone platforms. thinks data centers should defend themselves against drones, and partner with the state for missile defense.
A repeat of another attack
“A very similar attack on AWS data centers happened in March. But it’s worth separating the two events, because they involved different weapons. The confirmed March strikes used one-way attack drones. The July strikes on the Bahrain facilities appear to have involved missiles, and while Amazon hasn’t confirmed the extent of the damage, independent satellite imagery now appears to corroborate that it was significant.
“The March strikes marked a genuine shift. Commercial cloud facilities were never designed to sit inside a kinetic threat environment, and now they are being treated as legitimate military targets. That changes the security conversation for the whole industry.
The Bahrain World Trade Center (where the attacked Amazon data center is said to be housed) makes for a clearly visible and easily targeted object.
Transferable Model Of Defence
“It is important to be precise about the threat, though, because it is not one threat. Slow, low-flying, low-cost drones and high-speed missiles call for very different defences. Against the cheap and persistent drone threat, a layered counter-UAS approach – detect, track, then mitigate – is realistic and increasingly affordable. We already see this in Ukraine, where the private sector has taken on a real part of the air defence task against low-speed threats, using a mix of effectors. That model is transferable to critical civil infrastructure such as data centres.
“Faster-flying threats are a different problem. They require significantly more complex and far more expensive systems, which we cannot realistically expect a commercial operator to afford, or to be cleared and trained to operate. That part stays with state militaries.
“So the practical sequence for data centres is: defend yourself against drones first, and coordinate with the state for the missile threat. I expect this level of protection to become a standard part of how such sites are built and operated.”
For the Silo, Darija Grobova.
